

Hadow read a paper prepared by the Foreign Office on Soviet intentions in Cuba. He asked that this not be referred to as a British Government view.

One reason for the Soviet intervention was that Khrushchev saw the need, under heavy pressure from his defence chiefs, to take a strong part in the missile nuclear imbalance, which the Soviet Union recognises is in favour of the United States. As a politician Khrushchev probably also saw the need to early leverage for settlement of Berlin on terms that would enable him to carry out his claims. This is important in the Soviet mind towards China.

The development of bases in Cuba was seen as the method to do this. It would also enable Khrushchev to have a knave-deus ex machina to be used in connection with his visit to the United Nations. The Ukrainian peasant side of Khrushchev may have realised what this was a rather risky business. Perhaps he even opposed it at first. His initial basic miscalculation was to let himself be persuaded.

The Foreign Office thinks that the military persuaded Khrushchev the vital stage was the landing of the equipment. After that the build-up could go on with impunity, covered by explanations that the whole thing was only defensive.

Khrushchev also miscalculated in thinking that intermediate range missiles would not be discovered by the United States -- or that if they were discovered the United States would take no particular violent action, but would go to the U.N. Khrushchev apparently gambled that in the U.N. he could appeal for the support of the neutrals and uncommitted countries in bringing down any effective action.

He would also have made much of the name of the Soviet Ambassador to London in July. He had the names seen to have been set in motion since then. The last statement of Khrushchev is a direct appeal to the United States against any attempt to interfere with shipping.

Khrushchev and the Russians seemed to think that the plan was working very well. They were taking doubly sure, they sent threats to the United States with a solid assurance.

Then came the final U.N. statement that the weapons were all sent. Until the visit of Kennedy to London, the Russians may have thought that they could get away with the move. Kennedy in London for the first time, and not commencing his visit the afternoon and evening before, the U.N. Committee recommended a strong statement.

In any event the Kennedy announcement of the blockade caught the Soviet Union completely off balance. It is highly significant that the Russian statement immediately moved to caution. This was on April, a word of American determination to see that

and down.

There were indeed two : Khrushchev's letters talking about Tabarin and the fact that the Russians were offering to let the tougher people in the anti-line stand while the rest of the world remained for nothing instead of creating fear. Now the line returned to normal. Khrushchev's letter to the United States said the effort had been forced into ~~the hands of the United States~~, but it was a dangerous step. It would have led the United States to conclude that the Russians were now offering to let them in and stand. Then the United States withdrew the lines and it disappeared first (and the power alone was it was supposed to be the power), the situation became much worse for the Russians. This surprised Khrushchev with the possibility of having Khrushchev's position to bomb the United States ignored, and this he certainly would not do. Hence he cut his losses.

Although the Turkish deal was dropped, there is an oblique allusion to it in the proposal of some sort of agreement between NATO and the Warsaw pact.

It is significant that since the Cuban crisis there has been no Russian statement on Berlin. There is no indication that the Russians mean to move there soon.

We should not assume that Khrushchev has had an easy time in the Presidency. Undoubtedly there was some tension and there are bitter recriminations. Evidently Khrushchev is still in control, and there is no evidence of an anti-Khrushchev movement. But undoubtedly Khrushchev will be very careful in watching the internal situation.

The Foreign Office does not expect a violent Soviet reaction. Rather, it expects a prolonged period of wound-licking, and painful post-mortems.

Who are the "tough" people in the Presidency? Britain doesn't know for sure. But there is a fairly Chinese-Stalin wing left, and Malinovsky (Minister of Defense) may be one of the tough ones.

Is there much pressure to help Khrushchev save face? This is always a false premise, and we would be foolish to think about it. The Communists always have lines of retreat.

How does the Foreign Office think that since the U-2 incident, the Russians discounted American aerial surveillance? Even with the ability of aerial photography, it is not always sure. It did not directly establish the fact of offensive bases until three days before the blockade. The Russians might have gotten away with it. They might have concluded that the U.S. would not do anything before Khrushchev arrived in the United States.